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The rise of fast communication media both at the core and at the edge has resulted in unprecedented numbers of
sophisticated and intelligent wireless IoT devices. Tactile Internet has enabled the interaction between humans
and machines within their environment to achieve revolutionized solutions both on the move and in real-time.
Many applications such as intelligent autonomous self-driving, smart agriculture and industrial solutions, and
self-learning multimedia content filtering and sharing have become attainable through cooperative, distributed
and decentralized systems, namely, volunteer computing. This article introduces a blockchain-enabled resource
sharing and service composition solution through volunteer computing. Device resource, computing, and
intelligence capabilities are advertised in the environment to be made discoverable and available for sharing
with the aid of blockchain technology. Incentives in the form of on-demand service availability are given
to resource and service providers to ensure fair and balanced cooperative resource usage. Blockchains are
formed whenever a service request is initiated with the aid of fog and mobile edge computing (MEC) devices
to ensure secure communication and service delivery for the participants. Using both volunteer computing
techniques and tactile internet architectures, we devise a fast and reliable service provisioning framework
that relies on a reinforcement learning technique. Simulation results show that the proposed solution can
achieve high reward distribution, increased number of blockchain formations, reduced delays, and balanced
resource usage among participants, under the premise of high IoT device availability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The future of intelligent and on-demand time-sensitive service provisioning relies heavily on
system distribution and decentralization. At its early stages, smart city applications have relied on
centralized solutions such as the Cloud. Most applications (e.g. healthcare, autonomous driving
vehicles, etc.) have offloaded their tasks in terms of computing, storage and data analytics to cloud
datacenters and storage sites [1]. IoT devices simply acted as data collectors with minimal data
filtration and analysis at their end. This was mainly due to the IoT devicesâĂŹ minimal hardware,
software and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, cellular communication was restricted by low
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bandwidth availability, slow data rates, and minimal simultaneous device connections. Most devices
relied on short distance communication such as wireless local area networks (WLANs) or wired
connections. Such a solution seemed to be promising at first, given the low number of IoT devices.
But with the enormous expansion in the number of IoT devices, in addition to the advancements
in user device capabilities in terms of hardware, software and communication, traditional cloud
solutions were no longer attractive, especially for time-sensitive applications such as autonomous
self-driving vehicles [2], intelligent health monitoring [3], and emergency response services [4].
At the early stages of research and development of the Fifth Generation (5G) communication net-
work [5], but before its early stage deployment, alternative distributed and decentralized solutions
were made available to support time-sensitive applications, namely fog and mobile edge computing
(MEC) [6]. Fog and MEC were introduced to provide processing and storage solutions located in the
vicinity of mobile and edge IoT devices. This will somewhat eliminate latencies and communication
delays experienced from the reliance on processing and storage cloud entities. Although such
solutions were first experienced with cloudlets [7], fog and MEC have seen enhanced performance
with todayâĂŹs smart city and IoT ecosystems. To put things into perspective, fog computing
and MEC provide an alternative central access point for not only communication purposes, but
also processing, storage, and intelligence. For instance, data that requires immediate attention and
processing is handled by the fog, otherwise the job will be offloaded to the cloud. Alternatively,
jobs submitted to the cloud can be offloaded to a number of fogs for processing or storage. In both
cases, this relieves the pressure off the cloud datacenter and ensures that all jobs are delivered
within the requested quality of service (QoS) and quality of experience (QoE) requirements [8].
As technology has progressed at both the communication (e.g. 5G, MANETs, VANETs, etc.) and
service (e.g. fog and edge devices) layers, IoT and smart city applications started relying heavily on
decentralized and distributed solutions. As such, the concept of fog-to-cloud (F2C) communication
shifted more towards fog-to-fog (F2F) communication [8]. Both resource sharing and collaboration
for task completion became a necessity in order to complete jobs on time and meet the QoS and
QoE requirements. Data replication and service availability at different fog sites made it possible for
user-specific services to be composed on demand [9]. Solutions for data and service decomposition
were developed to ensure that most of the data and simple services are available at fog sites,
thus allowing for services to be composed [9]. Users requesting services that once were available
on the cloud, can now be composed and delivered in a timely manner. More complex services,
especially ones that require machine learning techniques, still use resources of cloud datacenters
and storage sites. Profit sharing mechanisms were also introduced to motivate cooperation and
collaboration among fog and MEC devices that belong to different internet and network service
providers (INP/NSP) [8].
Although this provided an opportunity to overcome significant issues at earlier stages of the
cloud distribution strategy, various user-specific requests (which arise as a result of new technology
availability) still cannot be fulfilled at both the edge and cloud. For instance, multimedia user-specific
services that require the rendering of content (e.g. video and audio enhancements, color effects,
and language support [10]), and which may not be available at the fog or cloud (or at least the
added rendering capabilities), can only be supported through end-device cooperation (i.e. resource,
hardware and software capability sharing). A significant number of todayâĂŹs service requests,
and most of tomorrowâĂŹs requests will require some type of artificial intelligence (AI) integration
to achieve enriched service capabilities. As such, reliance on the fog and cloud to fulfill all complex
and composite service requests is no longer tolerable. Involvement of resource-rich IoT devices
in the service composition and delivery process is thus highly essential [11]. Decentralization,
distribution, collaboration and cooperation, and resource and intelligence sharing at the end-device
level is required more than ever to not only achieve the requirements of most user- and device-
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specific service requests, but also to achieve a balanced workload on all participants in todayâĂŹs
complicated networked ecosystem. Service requesters are no longer acquirers of consumable
services, but rather are involved heavily in the service provisioning process. As such the concept of
volunteer computing in a tactile internet environment is highly needed for tomorrowâĂŹs beyond
5G infrastructure, namely, 6G.
Blockchain technology is being employed with several applications and integrated with other
technologies such as IoT, health, energy, Fog/Edge, to name few [12][13][14]. The vision of 6G is to
achieve total connectivity of intelligent things on-ground, in the sea, in the sky, and in space [15].
To do so, we cannot simply rely on solutions that assume devices will cooperate and collaborate to
share their resources and capabilities in the service provisioning process. Incentives in any form
must be given to participants to ensure fair usage and proper compensation for their involvement
[16]. Such incentives may be in the form of service provider profit sharing or prioritized access to
subscribed services. As such, the significant majority of tasks will be conducted by collaborative
IoT devices with the aid of fog and MEC computing devices. Centralized entities such as cloud
datacenters will act as a backbone to smart city applications and support the decentralization
process by offering intelligent processing and storage capabilities for very complex tasks that
cannot be delivered at the edge. Securely communicating data and collaborating to form and deliver
services can only be achievable with the aid of secure decentralized infrastructures that support
device to device communication. A plethora of applications will benefit from such incentivized
cooperative solutions. For instance, connected vehicles can share resources (e.g. computing, storage,
power, etc.) as part of the cooperation process. In return, service providers get rewarded for such
on-demand requests. Multimedia content sharing is another hot topic in today’s social networking
[6]. In densely crowded environments, such as stadiums, spectators can have on-demand access to a
game replay with certain user-specific content enhancements from other spectators’ devices. Such
a collaborative environment will require some sort of an incentive model to ensure cooperation
among participants.
This article proposes a cooperative and collaborative solution among edge IoT devices to share
their resources, computation, storage and intelligence capabilities. Blockchain is used as a form of
decentralization to compose and deliver composite services securely and privately [17]. Incentives
are provided to participants to ensure that the developed framework is sustainable for all partici-
pants, namely, both the service providers and requesters. The contributions of the proposed work
are summarized as follows:
• A cooperative IoT framework that supports volunteer computing at the end-user device level
to share their resources, processing, storage and intelligence capabilities.
• An incentive-based mechanism is adopted to the framework to support and offer compensa-
tion for participating in resource sharing and service composition processes.
• A blockchain technique is adapted to support decentralized service composition and delivery
to sustain data privacy and consensus among participants.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 explores some of the most recent related
work in the literature. Section 3 formulates the problem and discusses the optimization aspect of
the problem. The proposed IoT framework is considered in Section 4. Reward distribution and
blockchain formation specifics are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides details in regards to
the conducted simulations. Finally, we conclude the article in Section 7 with some future work
insights.
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2 RELATEDWORK
The reliance on information and communication technology resources have grown exponentially,
and data processing became the most important strategic resource. This is mainly due to the
increase in data volume. The solution to big data processing can be achieved through collaboration
processing and data sharing, however, unwillingness to collaborate, the fear of resource sharing
(i.e. trust issues), and sometimes inability to share due to connectivity problems are few examples
of persisting problems [18].
Resource sharing techniques through collaboration (i.e. volunteer computing) are emerging as
a mean to reduce repetitive tasks, faster computing, and promote the concept of decentralized
open-source computing. However, we still face two main issues in regards to how to properly
incentivize participants to volunteer their resources and how to ensure the security and privacy
for the participants’ data. The work in [19][20] have proposed a mechanism of incentives through
advancing the concept of data sharing based on blockchain and smart contracts. The former uses
smart contracts to encourage users to share their data to overcome trust fear. Nash game equilibrium
analysis was used for incentives. Moreover, a reliable collaboration model for resource owners,
miners, and trusted third parties have been proposed in [20]. The participant signs a smart contract
first and then shares data and resources via blockchain. The incentive concept is being developed
through revenue distribution among participants.
Volunteer resources are not only limited to regular cloud participants but have been also in-
vestigated at the vehicular network level. A privacy-preserving mechanism using blockchain for
incentive announcement for communications between connected vehicles, namely, CreditCoin, has
been proposed in [21]. An aggregation protocol has been used for incentives. Similarly, the authors
in [22] proposed a new paradigm by merging vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) with volunteer
computing to provide efficient utilization of idle computing resources. The authors evaluated their
proposed paradigm using job completion, throughput and latency to show better results compared
with traditional approaches. Neither incentives nor blockchain were considered in their solution.
When it comes to personal volunteer computing, in [23], the authors proposed a distributed
computing approach that leverages personal devices (smartphones and laptops) to the personal
computation needs from the general public of programmers to perform significant applications
or community interest. Such a paradigm, also, encourages developers to maintain and enhance
new applications part-time, where no additional hardware is needed, and the process of tools was
done over existing devices. While in [24], the authors have proposed volunteer computing as a
service (VCaaS) based edge computing, where volunteer computing resources are employed for
edge computing to process data from IoT devices. Security and privacy were considered as well.
To evaluate the effectiveness of such a newmodel, some researchers have studied the requirements
in addition to the strength of current volunteer computing platforms [25]. The authors have analysed
multiple issues such as the effectiveness of the active participants and how the computation and
communication can be performed in addition to the analysis of task distribution and result validation
polices. On the other hand, the authors in [26] addressed the gap between the computational pillars.
The authors drew on social psychology and online communities’ researches and proposed a three-
dimensional model of the factors determining contributions of volunteer computing users (tenure,
personal motivations and team affiliation). Also, the authors identified the relations between these
factors and the actual contribution level.
Among the many technical challenges emerging from this new technology, the most challenging
problem is task scheduling, where the resources are not only heterogeneous but also may go offline
at any moment. The authors in [27] proposed a deadline preference dispatch scheduling (DPDS)
algorithm which is based on a dynamic task scheduling algorithm for heterogeneous volunteer
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computing platforms. In DPDS, the task that has the minimum deadline constraint will complete
first by assigning it to a near volunteer node. Also, to maximize the number of computed tasks
before the deadline constraint and to fully utilize volunteered resources, the authors proposed an
improved dispatch constraint scheduling algorithm (IDCD) where tasks are selected according to
their priorities. The authors used a risk prediction model in the IDCD algorithm to ensure efficient
application execution by predicting a completion risk of each task. In [28], the authors used a neural
network mechanism to predict the job execution time and genetic algorithm, in order to distribute
jobs to volunteers with adjusting parameters to make it responsive to any changes. The results
showed the benefits of the proposed model even when volunteer computing network dimensions
are not high.
As seen from the literature work, several challenges arise as a result of adopting this technology
at a large scale in terms of the heterogeneity of the resources, the variety of the capabilities, the
distribution of the tasks, the efficiency and utilization of volunteered resources. However, even if
all of these issues were managed and solved, retaining a large number of participants’ resources,
encouraging data sharing, and guaranteeing continuous contributions are only possible if we
provide trust and proper incentives. This has not been explored yet, and we believe that this article
will address those issues.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a tactile internet network environment, as depicted in Figure 1, comprising of a plethora
of access points (APs) and base Stations (BSs) belonging to different ISPs and NSPs of different
technologies, such as LTE eNB, Wi-Fi APs, MEC servers, etc. Moreover, the network environment
comprises a number of IoT end-devices UE = {ue1,ue1, ...uen} that have a set of resources and
capabilities defined as Cap = {cap1, cap2, ..., capw }, and have been requested to cooperate in order
to complete a service request Reqi = (Di ,Qi ,Oi ). The request is defined through its description
properties Di (defined later), the acceptable levels of specific QoS parameters Qi , and any other
requirements Oi such as cost or prioritized preferences. A service is composed of a set of tasks
S j = {t1, t2, ...tm}, in which each task t has a size αtm , dependency on other tasks or sub-tasks
βtm , and completion deadline γtm . The complexity of a task will be measured by the participant
in terms of its computation or storage intensity δtm , defined in the form of processor cycles per
data block and energy consumption ζtm . Such a measurement is not only dependent on the task’s
characteristics, but also varies in accordance to each node’s capabilities (e.g. hardware, software,
etc.).
3.1 Maximizing Participant Gain
Each participant uen in the service composition and delivery process aims at maximizing its
participation gain Gtn,m as defined in (1), by increasing its reward Rtn,m as defined in (2), reducing
its workloadWtn,m as defined in (3), and eliminating/decreasing its penalties Ptn,m as a result of
performing task tm as defined in (4). Tasks with a large size αtm , more dependencies βtm , and stricter
completion time γtm will lead to higher rewards Rtn,m . Furthermore, achieving the requested QoS
levels for a task qtm within the set time limits will lead to higher reward values. On the contrary,
not achieving the task (or achieving the task but not meeting the requested QoS and time limits)
will lead to more penalties Ptn,m , hence, less rewards. Penalties are incorporated within the gain
function to ensure that participants are performing the requested tasks on time and in accordance
to the set service requirements. Nodes that simply join the composition process without adhering
to the set rules (i.e. nodes participating in compositions beyond their resource capabilities for large
reward returns) will receive penalties for not adhering to the set service requirements. This will
ensure that fair participation among cooperating nodes is achieved. Moreover, the workloadWtn,m
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Fig. 1. Tactile internet network environment comprising of a plethora of communication technologies, in
addition to volunteer computing.
is dependent on the participants capabilities, such that an end-device that is described as energy-
efficient with high and complex processing capabilities will complete a task with less workload
(e.g. time, power usage, etc.). The requested/expected levels for reward, workload and penalty
specifications, namely, χtm = (qtm ,γtm ,δtm , ζtm ) is compared to the actual levels achieved at time
t , namely, `χtm (t) = ( `qtm (t), `γtm (t), `δtm (t), `ζtm (t)). Having a solution where `χtm ≥ χtm results in
higher rewards and less workload, which in essence leads to higher gains Gtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)).
Gtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) = Rtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) −Wtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) − Ptn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) (1)
Rtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) =
M∑
m=t0,qtm
≤q`tn,m (t )≤qtm
τqq`tn,m (t) +
M∑
m=t0,γ`tn,m (t )≤γtm
τγmax
(
0, (γtm − γ`tn,m (t))
)
(2)
Wtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) =
M∑
m=t0
δ`tn,m (t) +
M∑
m=t0
ζ`tn,m (t) (3)
Ptn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) =
M∑
m=t0,qtm
≥q`tn,m (t )≥qtm
σqq`tn,m (t) +
M∑
m=t0,γ`tn,m (t )≥γtm
σγmax
(
0, (γ`tn,m (t) − γtm )
)
(4)
τq is the reward given for a participant that successfully completes the task within the quality
limits set, namely, q
tm
≤ q`tn,m (t) ≤ qtm . The floor and ceiling QoS values are prone to change
frequently according to network performance. If the network resources are limited, then the offered
QoS value range for a particular service would be reduced to accommodate for the available
resources (i.e. participant resources). Details in regards to dynamic configurations of network
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parameters is out of the scope of this article and has been discussed in [8]. τγ is the reward per
time unit given for participants that successfully complete the assigned task at the deadline time
γtm , such that higher rewards are given for less time units γ`tn,m (t) needed to complete the task.
δ`tn,m (t) is the processor/storage workload incurred on the participant for performing the given
task which resulted in the consumption of processor/storage resources at time t . Similarly, ζ`tn,m (t)
is the workload incurred on the participant for the power consumed to perform the given task. The
evaluation of the proposed systemâĂŹs energy consumption is measured in terms of the nodes
workload to complete a task. The computation intensity (i.e. CPU cycles per bit) to perform a
service task is considered when analyzing the energy consumption for a candidate participant. We
adopted the technique introduced in [29] to measure the power usage per CPU cycle. σq is the
penalty incurred on the participant for performing the given task which resulted in QoS values
below the requested levels. Similarly, σγ is the penalty incurred on the participant for not meeting
the task deadline γtm .
As such, the objective that must be considered while distributing tasks among participants is to
maximize the gain achieved among all participants while adhering to obligations arising from the
requested service as described in (5).
P1 :
(
maximize
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=t0
Gtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t))
)
s .t . C1 : max
Ntm ⊂N∑
n=1
Cn
(5)
The optimization problem is solved for collaboratively by all nodeswhom arewilling to participate
and collaborate to deliver simple and composite services. Details in regards to the solution is looked
at in Section 5. The selection process is reliant on the rank given by other participating nodes
towards the participant’s behaviour, which is dependent on previous successful task completions
and the node’s cooperation willingness characteristics. Hence, as seen in the constraint of (5), the
set of participants which attain the maximum node cooperation and willingness score (Cn ), defined
in Section 4, are selected for the composition and delivery process.
3.2 Blockchain Formation
The other issue that needs to be considered is the blockchain formation problem. Not only par-
ticipants’ capabilities and their scores are considered, but also whether the result of performing
a task by the participant is consistent with the input of the next block in the blockchain, hence,
blockchain formation. The selection process must ensure that similarity measures between sequen-
tial blocks are considered in the formation process. The goal is to formulate a composition path
(i.e. blockchain) that increases the similarity score between one block and another, in addition to
the overall transaction for a service request. We consider the following optimization problem as
defined in (6).
P2 :
(
max
Ntm ⊂N∑
n=1
M∑
m=t0
Compchar (uen,tm ,uen+1,tm+1)
)
s .t . C1 : max
(
RWBcomp
) (6)
where RWBcomp is the reward value for a service composition transaction using blockchain, attained
through a reinforcement learning algorithm. The reward value is determined as a result of previous
records of blockchain formations’ experiences resulting from the selection of different blockchain
patterns.
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4 COOPERATIVE IOT FRAMEWORK
Participants in the service sharing and composition process have two strategies, namely, participate
or not-participate. The strategy is dependent on a number of factors: i) the device’s capability (i.e.
hardware, software, etc.), ii) the user’s cooperation rationality given certain participation constraints,
iii) the device’s cooperation awareness in terms of continuous learning ability through analysis and
strategy readjustment.
4.1 Participant Capabilities
Upon joining a network environment as a participant in the service provisioning process, end-
devices (uen ) communicate their capabilities Capuen set (see Example 1, presented in XML format
for reader-friendly purposes) to the nearest MEC device either directly through point-to-point
communication or through other devices such as WiFi APs, device-to-device communication for
Ad Hoc networks, etc. The capability list and directory is consistently updated and shared among
all fog and cloud entities. Whenever a service request Reqi is communicated to the participants
with a defined set of description properties Di , described through an ontological structure [30],
participants compare the service request properties against their capabilities. Nodes can determine
whether the needed resources/capabilities are available using syntactic and semantic similarity
comparison against the request [31]. Details are out of the scope of this article and have been
covered in an earlier work [31].
Example 1 - Device capabilities for node 𝒖𝒆𝒏:
<Participant>
<Device>
<DeviceID>ue_12345</DeviceID>
<DeviceMacAddress>00-21-5F-CE-AB-DC</DeviceMacAddress>
<DeviceIPAddress>192.168.1.2</DeviceIPAddress>
<Capabilities>
<HardwareCapabilities>
<CPU_Model>Intel_i7-6500U</CPU_Model>
<CPU_CLK>2.5GHz</CPU_CLK>
<Memory_RAM>8GB</Memory_RAM>
<Memory_SSD>1TB</Memory_SSD>
<Voice_IN>Yes</Voice_IN>
<Voice_OUT>Yes</Voice_OUT>
<Video_IN>Yes</Video_IN>
<Video_OUT>Yes</Video_OUT>
...
</HardwareCapabilities>
<MediaCapabilities>
<Color_Effects>Red_eye_color_correction</Color_Effects>
<Overlays>Video_FX</Overlays>
...
</MediaCapabilities>
<StoredFiles>
...
</StoredFiles>
<OtherResources>
...
</OtherResources>
</Capabilities>
</Device>
</Participant>
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4.2 Participant Cooperation Rationality
As described earlier, not only the intent for participants to maximize the gain from the cooperation is
necessary, but also to ensure that highly capable and cooperative nodes are joining the cooperation
process to ensure diversified resource and service availability. A participant’s rationality towards
cooperation is dependent on a different factors, namely, i) the type and characteristics of the service
request, ii) it’s current behaviour towards cooperative entities based on the current network status
and previous experiences, and iii) the participant’s cooperative status.
4.2.1 Participant Task Characteristic Preferences.
Other than the device’s capabilities towards achieving a service task, participant’s may decide
to join or not join the cooperation process due to the type and characteristics of the service.
Participants may have certain preferences in terms of what service tasks it may want to perform.
For instance, a participant may decide to not join non-educational service requests or that of
another characteristics. As such, upon joining a network environment, participants advertise their
service characteristics participation preferences and priorities to ensure that they are excluded
from non-preferred services. Example 2 provides an example of such advertisement.
Example 2 - Device service preferences for node 𝒖𝒆𝒏:
<Participant>
<Device>
<DeviceID>ue_12345</DeviceID>
<DeviceMacAddress>00-21-5F-CE-AB-DC</DeviceMacAddress>
<DeviceIPAddress>192.168.1.2</DeviceIPAddress>
<ServicePreferences>
<Duration>
<MaxTaskDuration>5000msec</MaxTaskDuration>
<MinTaskDuration>100msec</MinTaskDuration>
...
</Duration>
<OtherParticipants>
<MaxNumOfParticipants>10</ MaxNumOfParticipants>
<MinNumOfParticipants>1</ MinNumOfParticipants>
<MinParticipantCharacteristic>Neutral</ MinParticipantCharacteristic>
...
</OtherParticipants >
<ServiceType>Multimedia</ServiceType>
</ServicePreferences>
</Device>
</Participant>
Task characteristics and preferences are stored in a hierarchical ontology structure, modeled as
objects, concepts and relationships. As such, variations in service semantics and functionality syntax
are compared to determine similarity and differences among objects. Thus, task characteristics are
compared against participant preferences to determine matching and non-matching features. More
matching features in comparison to non-matching features determines that a service preference
match is likely found. On the contrary, whenever a task is described to be not in the preference
category of the participant, then less matching features are found in comparison to non-matching
features in the task and participant preferences characteristics. This concept is modeled and defined
in (7).
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Compchar (uen , tm) =
charprefuen ∩ chartm 
wmatch
charprefuen ∩ chartm  +wmatch charprefuen ∪ chartm  (7)
where
charprefuen ∩ chartm  is the number of matching features when comparing the participant’s
task preferences against the requested service task characteristics. Similarly,
charprefuen ∪ chartm 
represents the non-matching features in the comparison.
4.2.2 Participant Behaviour.
The participant’s behaviour towards other participants in the cooperative network is very crucial in
determining which set of devices will provide the optimal solution collaboratively. The behaviour
of participants is dependent on different criteria, but most importantly the nature of the user.
For instance, a participant that has had negative feedback as a result of cooperation with other
participants categorized under a certain characteristics category may pose strict conditions for
cooperation for future service requests. Therefore, a ranking strategy is adopted to classify the
participants’ behaviour. All participants involved in the cooperation process will rank each other
at the end of the service composition task, in addition to the serving MEC/Fog device and trusted
entities, as depicted in Figure 2. This will ensure that a fair score is given to all participants and
allows only those with an acceptable level of behaviour join the cooperation process and share the
distributed rewards. The figure outlines an example of where service requesters SR j , fog service
providers, and trusted entities TEx rank participants (whom volunteer their service capabilities
Capn ) in accordance to their behaviour, based on current and previous service composition processes.
Ranking by requesters and trusted entities is only performed by those with direct cooperation
towards participants, whereas the fog ranks all participants.
SR1
S1={tS1.1,tS1.2}
SR2
SRj
Sj={tj.1,tj.2, ,tj.m}
.
.
.
ue3
Cap2={tS2.2}
ue1
Cap1={tS1.2,tS2.3}
ue2
Cap2={tS1.1}
ue4
Cap2={tS2.1}
uen
Capn={tn}
.
.
.
S2={tS2.1,tS2.2,
tS2.3}
TE1
{ue1,ue3}
Fog1
TEx
{uen}
.
.
.
All Participants
SR = Service Requester, ue = participant device, TE = Trusted 
Entity, S = service, Cap = capabilities, t = task
Fig. 2. Requests in the form of service tasks are fulfilled using the capabilities of participant devices. Each
participant is ranked by the service requesters and fog/trusted entities that have knowledge about the
behaviour of participants, based on the current service composition process and/or any previous compositions.
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We categorize participants’ behaviours using the following ranks/categories:
• Highly Non-Cooperative - Participants of this category are described as devices that pose
security threats to the network, regardless of whether the participant has been asked to join
a composition task or not. Such participants need to be identified, reported, isolated and
removed from the network to avoid any future threats to the network structure.
• Non-Cooperative - Such participants pose a security and/or privacy threat to the network
only when requested to join a cooperative composition task. Hence, such devices need to be
identified, reported and isolated, but not removed from the network environment. Nodes of
this type may request services but cannot participate in the service provisioning process.
• Neutral - Nodes described as neutral pose no security issues to the network and may par-
ticipate in the cooperation process. The results of whether the participant will sufficiently
attain the task requirements are unknown, and thus should only be requested to join the
composition process when no other participant of a higher rank is available. Devices of this
type are usually casually interested in attaining rewards from cooperation tasks.
• Partially Cooperative - Participants of this category have a fluctuating level of cooperative
task participation which is dependent on the type and characteristics of the service request,
in addition to the network conditions. The objective of such participants is not only the
amount of participation reward, but also the context of the service.
• Cooperative - Such participants are considered cooperative at all times and the main objective
of such nodes is to increase the reward value. The participant may sometimes decline the
service task request whenever the penalties and workload outweighs the rewards. Therefore,
it is very important that rewards given for such participants are attractive enough to ensure
such nodes join the cooperation process.
• Highly Cooperative - This rank categorizes participants as highly cooperative in the sense
that in almost all circumstances, devices of this type will join the cooperation process even
if sometimes the task may lead to a loss in gain. Participants will join all cooperation tasks
unless a security or privacy threat is posed by other participants.
We adopt a weighted behaviour fuzzification function developed in [30] to give a score for each
category. This allows for the dynamic adjustment for the participants’ categories and provides
accurate and reliable participant scores. The fuzzified participant’s cooperative behaviour is defined
in (8).
Cn = zcateдory
(Ntm ⊂N∑
n=1
scoretm (uen ,uen+1)
)
(8)
where scoretm (uen ,uen+1) is the score in terms of cooperative characteristics that each participant
end-device, fog and trusted entity provides to all other participants. zcateдory () is the fuzzification
function used to determine the fuzzified participant’s cooperative behaviour Cn .
4.2.3 Participation Status.
Although incentives are provided to share resources and get involved in the composition process.
Serving fog and MEC entities have authority to ban certain nodes not only according to their
cooperation category, but also in accordance to their current and previous participation status. For
instance, nodes that show greedy behaviour, where they only participate whenever highly valuable
rewards are given may be banned from participation in future cooperation sessions to ensure fair
distribution of rewards to other novice participants. Moreover, a node itself may decide to whether
participate in cooperation/composition tasks or not. As such the participation status changes in
accordance to the participant’s desire, in addition to the context. We also note here that serving fog
ACM Trans. Internet Technol., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2020.
1:12 I. Al Ridhawi et al.
entities may ban nodes from participating in cooperation tasks if participants reject cooperation
requests excessively.
4.3 Participant Cooperation Awareness
We assume that most participants have machine learning (ML) capabilities and at the same time
can achieve the task of federated learning collaboratively. Each participant adapts its own ML
algorithm and relies on the Stochastic Gradient Decent (SGD) method to perform stochastic
approximation of gradient descent optimization and replaces the data set gradient with an estimated
one through random sub-set data selection [32]. In terms of services that require distributed and
collaborated federated learning tasks, tasks’ outputs and trained models are either authenticated
using the blockchain consensus algorithm or directed to the serving fog node for authentication
and aggregation. Such a decision on whether to use blockchain consensus or the fog is dependent
on the type of service request. Services classified as ’sensitive’ are directed to the fog, otherwise the
blockchain consensus method is used.
Furthermore, with regards to whether to participate or not-participate in the service sharing and
composition process, the training on data is performed locally on the end-user devices. Participants
use previous gain achievements and other criteria in regards to cooperation of other participants
to determine whether future cooperative sessions are ideal in regards to the gains achieved. Local
data is also trained to avoid participating with other devices or share data that may be classified as
hazardous leading to intrusion attacks [33].
5 REWARD DISTRIBUTION
Participants are selected in accordance to their advertised capabilities and the need for task distri-
bution among a number of end-devices. As discussed earlier in Section 4.1, participants advertise
their capabilities to the nearest fog/MEC device. From there, the information is shared among
neighbouring fog and MEC nodes. We classify the participant search process into two categories,
namely, simple and complex. The former considers service compositions that rely entirely on the ad-
vertised data by participants to fog/MEC nodes, where the participants are selected and a blockchain
is formed to record the composition process, which is later used for the reinforcement learning
process (discussed later). The latter, requires the aid of miners (i.e. trusted entities) to search for
capabilities not registered on the framework and requires coordination among participants and
miners to complete the composition process on the blockchain. Moreover, the selection process
among the two methods is also dependent on the time-sensitivity and QoS restrictions.
5.1 Simple Search Process
Upon receipt of the service request from a requester for a simple service (i.e. one with restricted time
and QoS constraints or with availability of matching capabilities), a workflow plan is constructed
to determine the tasks needed to be composed to deliver the composite service request. In addition
to the tasks, the workflow plan identifies the best matching candidates in accordance to their
cooperative characteristics scores as defined in (8). Figure 3 illustrates an example of a workflow
plan constructed by the serving fog device. In our work, service tasks performed by participants in
the composition process are modelled using Workflow-nets which are an extension to Petri-nets
[10]. Workflows guarantee the correctness of the cooperation and reachability problem [10]. A
Petri-net is a directed graph in which nodes are either transitions or places, where a place P is
connected to one or more transitions represented as Tasks. Transitions perform service tasks and
are represented as tokens residing in places. A transition is said to be enabled only when there are
no empty places (i.e. places with no tokens) connected to it as input. When a transition executes a
task, tokens are removed from each of the transitionâĂŹs input places and tokens are created in
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each of its output places. Moreover, workflows ensure that there is one place with no incoming
transition and one place with no outgoing transition. More details in regards to workflows are
highlighted in [10].
 
Service Task 2 to be provided by participant 𝒖𝒆𝒏+𝟏:  
<Service_Task_2> 
 <Input_Description> 
  <Type>VideoStream</Type> 
  <ID>Movie_12345</ID> 
  <Video_Encoding>AVI</Video_Encoding> 
  ... 
     </Input_Description> 
 <Output_Description> 
  <Video_Effects>RedEyeColorCorrection</Video_Description> 
  … 
 </Output_Description> 
</Service_Task2> 
 
 
Service Task 1 to be provided by participant 𝒖𝒆𝒏:  
<Service_Task_1> 
 <Input_Description> 
  <Type>VideoStream</Type> 
  <ID>Movie_12345</ID> 
  <Video_Encoding>MP4</Video_Encoding> 
  ... 
     </Input_Description> 
 <Output_Description> 
  <Video_Encoding>AVI</Video_Description> 
  <Jitter>0.7%</Jitter> 
  … 
 </Output_Description> 
</Service_Task1> 
 
P2 
Task 1
P3
P1
P7 P8
P4
P5
P6
Task 2
Task 3
Task 4 Task 5
Fig. 3. Aworkflow plan constructed by the serving Fog/MEC device outlining the set of tasks needed (described
as a transition) and the participants selected to perform the tasks (described as places) in accordance to their
cooperative behaviour score as defined in (8).
Resource and capability acquisition requests are sent along with detailed information in regards
to the task description in terms of its size, complexity, dependency, etc... to the selected candidates
to identify their willingness to participate in the cooperation process. Each node calculates its
anticipated gain (if any) according to (1) and forwards the information to the serving fog node. In
order for the participant to be selected and for the blockchain to be formed, the fog node will select
a set of candidates that achieve maximized gains according to (5). A blockchain is then formed from
the participants to ensure that the composition process is guaranteed and recorded. The blockchain
formation must consider (6), where the similarity score between two blocks (i.e. difference in
semantic distance) is measured to ensure difference is minimized (i.e. similarity is maximized). A
smaller difference in semantic distance represents a beneficial move towards meeting the service
requirements, indicating that the service request described through an ontology is nearly matching
the outputs provided by the participants. The blockchain formation process adheres to positive
results accumulated from previous similar blockchain formation trials. In essence, a reinforcement
learning process is adopted [8] to determine the reward value (RWBcomp ) defined in (9) that may be
attained from similar blockchain formations and to speed up the formation process.
RWBcomp =
Ntm ⊂N∑
n=1
(
P
(
¯Compchar (uen ,uen+1)
) × ˜Compchar (uen ,uen+1)) (9)
where P
(
¯Compchar (uen ,uen+1)
)
is the probability of achieving the highest similarity for a selected
block, ˜Compchar (uen ,uen+1) is the expected highest similarity for a selected block. A matrix is
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formed for all the different blockchains that may be formed and the similarity achieved by each
selected block in the blockchain pattern. The value function for selecting a block from a set of
alternative blocks in a blockchain is therefore:
Vuen (t) = Vuen (t − 1) + ρ
(
Vuen −Vuen (t − 1)
)
(10)
where Vuen (t − 1) is the previous value function at time t − 1, ρ is the learning rate, and Vuen =
RWBcomp . As such, the blockchain which results in the highest value function is selected to ensure
that constraint C1 is met as defined in (5).
Upon completion of the block selection process, all selected devices are informed and a blockchain
is formed to complete the composition process and record all transactions on the blockchain. The
requested service is then delivered to the requester and rewards are distributed to all participants.
All participants involved in the blockchain formation process then rank each other, in addition to
the serving fog node. The fuzzified participant cooperative behaviour score, defined in (8) is then
updated.
5.2 Complex Search Process
For service requests which require capabilities that are not registered among fog/MEC nodes, the
search process is considered complex and requires the aid of miners to search for capabilities on the
framework and coordinate with participants to complete the blockchain formation process. Such
a scenario can also be applied to cases with stringent QoS demands but relaxed time-sensitivity
to ensure maximized QoS adherence. Upon formation of the workflow plan to determine the
needed tasks and capabilities, the process for participant selection with registered capabilities is
identical to that of a simple search process (described in Section 5.1). Participants with matching
capabilities are selected as candidate nodes to be part of the blockchain. On the contrary, tasks
with no matching registered/advertised capabilities will follow the complex search process. Miners
(i.e. trusted entities) are notified of the capabilities needed to construct the block, which in essence
will be rewarded for their mining tasks. Miners must also ensure that participants’ cooperative
characteristics adhere to the constraints defined in (5) and (6). Figure 4 depicts an overview of the
complex search process.
Miners are defined as fixed or mobile network and mobile devices that have the capability of
communicating directly with other end-devices through different communication methods (e.g.
Ad Hoc). End-devices can gain the role of miners once the participant is labeled as trusted. Such a
label is given by fogs once the participant’s cooperative characteristics score exceeds a predefined
fog threshold, namely, Cn ≥ ϑ . The threshold ϑ , is a dynamic value that changes in accordance to
the network condition. For instance, a network with few participants will have a relaxed threshold
value to ensure that the service composition and delivery process is achieved. On the contrary, a
highly dense network may have more stringent threshold values to ensure accurate service quality
adherence. We assume that the dynamic configuration process follows that of a tabu-search assisted
variable configuration optimization mechanism introduced in [8]. As such, end-devices having
both roles, namely, participants and miners are capable of increasing there reward significantly.
Miners collect rewards for participating in the search process. Tasks which require the aid of miners
will have the reward Rtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t)) shared among both the miners and selected participant
end-devices. The portion of the share is dependent not only on the complexity needed to find the
participant, but also finding other participants in the composition process that will provide accurate
and stable blockchain formation which adheres to the overall QoS requirements. Therefore, the
reward value for miners is determined as a portion φ of the reward value determined by the fog as
described in (11).
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ue3
Cap3={tS2.2}
ue1
Cap1={tS1.2,tS2.3}
ue2
Cap2={tS1.1}
ue4
Cap4={tS2.1} uen
Capn={tn}
...
TE1
{ue1,ue3}
TEx
{uen}
Participant 
Devices
TE2
{ue1,ue2}
TE3
{ue3,ue4}
...
P2 
Task 1
P1
Task 2 Task m
Miners
...
Fog1
Workflow Plan
Tasks with no known 
registered capabilities 
are offloaded to the 
miners to search for 
candidate participants.
Fig. 4. Miners assist in the blockchain formation process by searching for end-devices with capabilities
needed to perform service tasks in cases of no registered capabilities or strict QoS requirements.
RtT E,m = φ
(
Rtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t))
)
(11)
The blockchain formation process follows the goal of forming a composition path that reduces
the semantic distance (i.e. increases similarity) between the current output of the block and that of
both the input of the next block and the service request. In essence, a blockchain is formed such
that the result of the blockchain (i.e. composition process) increases the semantic similarity with
the service request. Figure 5 visualizes the blockchain formation process. From the figure, we see
that the output of the first block (i.e. service task performed by participant ue1) and the input of
the next candidate block is compared to ensure that the one with the highest Cn value is selected.
At the same time, the semantic similarity between the output of the current block and the service
request requirement Reqi is compared against that of the output of the next candidate block and the
requirements Reqi . Such a technique will guarantee that the strict QoS conditions of the requester
are delivered.
OutB1 InB2 OutB2 InBm
B1 B2 Bm
Max(Compchar(OutB1,InB2))
Max(Compchar(OutB1,OutB2))
Max(Compchar(OutB1,InBn))
Fig. 5. Selecting a set of blocks with the aid of miners to form a complete blockchain.
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Additionally, before constructing the blockchain, miners report their candidate participants to
the fog, in which the former ensures that the participants in the blockchain achieve maximized
gains in accordance to (5). Algorithm 1 summarizes the process of forming a blockchain using the
complex search method.
ALGORITHM 1: Blockchain formation using the complex search procedure
1: Input: Service request Reqi is sent to the serving fog.
2: If (Reqi has stringent QoS ∨ Cap missing requested capability capw )
3: Construct workflow plan;
4: For (each task tm with no capw )
5: Request all available miners TE to search for cap tm ;
6: For(each TEx )
7: Calculate Sim1(TEx ) = Max(Compchar (OutBn , InBn+1 ));
8: Calculate Sim2(TEx ) = Max(Compchar (OutBn ,OutBn+1 ));
9: Calculate Sim3(TEx ) = Max(Compchar (OutBn , InBm ));
10: Send results Sim1(TEx ), Sim2(TEx ), Sim3(TEx ) to fog;
11: EndFor
12: Determinemax
Ntm ⊂N∑
n=1
M∑
m=t0
Compchar (uen,tm ,uen+1,tm+1);
13: Construct blockchain;
14: Distribute rewards to all participants according to RtT E,m and Rtn,m (χtm , χ`tm (t));
15: EndFor
16: EndIf
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Simulations were conducted using OMNET++ [34] and OverSim [35] as an overlay model for
service-specific overlays to mimic blockchains. Private blockchains are deployed with the SHA-256
hash algorithm being used to ensure consistent and secure communication between participants. In
fact, multiple private blockchains are created, one for each composition. The size of the simulated
network ares was 1000 × 1000 meters, with 10 MEC devices and up to 500 end-devices uniformly
distributed in the network. The number of trusted entities (i.e. miners) was set to 10% of the number
of participants. All end-devices, including miners act as both service requesters and providers.
MEC devices act as 802.11g APs with a bandwidth of 54 Mbps, with both computing and storage
capabilities. All end-devices are mobile with a speed of 1-2 meters per second. Service task and
capability descriptions are specified in OWL/RDF format [36]. Capability characteristics similarity
evaluations were conducted with the aid of OntoCAT [37]. The fuzzification and reasoning processes
were implemented using the jFuzzyLogic fuzzy engine [38]. Table 1 provides a summary of the
settings and configurations adapted in the simulator.
The proposed incentive-based blockchain service composition technique with reliance on miners,
referred to herein as Incentive-BC1, is compared against i) the same solution without the use
of miners, namely, with reliance on participant capability advertisements, referred to herein as
Incentive-BC2, ii) a non-incentive-based BC technique, referred to as non-Incentive-BC, and iii) a
traditional fog-based service composition solution that does not rely on end-devices for service
tasks, referred to as non-BC. Evaluations were conducted in regards to resource usage, Blockchain
formation hit ratio, the delay incurred for the blockchain formation process, and the total amount
of rewards shared among participants in the service provisioning process.
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Table 1. Simulator Settings
Simulation Parameters Numerical Values
Communication Protocol IEEE 802.11g (for communication between UEs and APs)
Bandwidth 54 Mbps
Number of APs 10
Number of UEs 500
Number of Miners 10% of UEs
UE Mobility Speed 1-2 m/s
Mobility model Random Waypoint
Blockchain Hash Algorithm SHA-256
Transmission/Idle Power 0.1 W/0.01 W (for APs) and 0.02 W/0.001 W (for UEs)
6.1 Resource Usage
The amount of resource consumption was based on the average CPU usage per participant (either
end-device or fog device) to compose and deliver the requested services. Results depicted in Figure
6 show that by relying on the proposed Incentive-B1method, the CPU usage per participant sharply
drops by more than 70% when compared against the non-BC method. Such a result is very promising
and shows that MEC solutions can heavily rely on end-devices to perform service tasks and focus
its responsibility on management rather than provisioning. Such a technique will also free up
MEC devices to accept more service requests from clients. The use of trusted entities (i.e. miners)
provides even further resource enhancements as shown in the figure when comparing the two
solutions, namely, Incentive-BC1 and Incentive-BC2. Comparing the two solutions, a reduction of
nearly 8% in CPU resource usage is seen for service requests with 10 service tasks.
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Fig. 6. A comparison of the overall CPU usage among four different methods, in terms of reliance on incentives,
blockchain and service miners.
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6.2 Energy Consumption
An evaluation of the energy consumption of the proposed scheme against the other methods was
conducted. The results depicted in Figure 7 are for a network density of 500 end-devices. For
the non-BC solution, we assume that all service tasks are available at the fog devices. For the
BC solutions, the service tasks are distributed among the end-devices, and hence require node
cooperation. Results show that the Incentive-BC1 (with the aid of miners) and the Incentive-BC2 both
provide similar power consumptions, which outperform the non-incentive mechanisms. It should
be noted that although from the figure we see that less power is consumed for the Incentive-BC1
technique in comparison to Incentive-BC2, this reduction is due to the offloaded tasks to miners to
select participants in the composition process. The overall reduction of the incentive mechanisms
over the non-incentive mechanisms is an overall reduction of nearly 10% and 140% in power
usage when compared against the non-Incentive-BC and non-BC, respectively. The incentivized
BC solutions have shown that energy consumption at edge nodes is reduced dramatically and is
shifted to the end-devices with less energy consumption at the end-device side.
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Fig. 7. A comparison of the overall energy consumption among four different methods, in terms of reliance
on incentives, blockchain and service miners.
6.3 Blockchain Formation Hit Ratio
Testing the effectiveness of the proposed technique in terms of service composition success rate,
namely, forming a successful and complete blockchain was considered in one of the experiments.
The goal was to increase the number of service requests that arrive simultaneously at the fog
devices and observe whether the proposed solution, namely, Incentive-BC1 can handle excessive
amounts of requests. As depicted in Figure 8, for the proposed incentive-based solution, the hit
ratio is nearly perfect for low to moderate simultaneous service requests. Moreover, for excessive
numbers of service requests, precisely with 100 simultaneous service requests, the Incentive-BC1
solution outperforms all other techniques with nearly 80% success rate in blockchain formations.
Additionally, we see that for the incentive based mechanisms (either with or without miners), the
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blockchain formation hit ratio is nearly double that of non-incentive techniques, namely, non-
Incentive-BC and non-BC. The hit ratios with 100 simultaneous service requests for Incentive-BC2,
non-Incentive-BC and non-BC are 65%, 34% and 21%, respectively.
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Fig. 8. Blockchain formation success rate in terms of the number of simultaneous service requests for four
different solutions.
6.4 Blockchain Formation Delay
An experiment was also conducted to determine the delay encountered in forming blockchains (i.e.
composing services) as the number of participants vary. A comparison of the proposed solution
against the three other techniques is shown in Figure 9. The figure shows the average experienced
delay, from the initiation of the service request and the completion of the blockchain formation,
namely, composition of the requested service. The Incentive-BC1 solution outperforms the other
techniques due to its capability of adapting to the time-constraints of the requested service. Nodes
having time-sensitive delay requirements are carried out either at the fog site (if services are
available) or carried out by the end-devices with the aid of fog devices and miners. With 500
participants, the blockchain formation delay is reduced by nearly 19%, 49%, and 89%when comparing
Incentive-BC1 against Incentive-BC2, non-Incentive-BC and non-BC, respectively. We note here that
some services cannot be composed (i.e. cannot form some blockchains) and hence are not considered
in the results. Results in regards to the ratio of non-successful blockchain formations are presented
earlier in Figure 9.
6.5 Reward Distribution
Reward analysis was conducted on the proposed Incentive-BC1 solution against the Incentive-BC2
solution. The main objective of this test is to determine the proportion of rewards gained by miners
against end-devices, and whether miners reduce the overall rewards distributed among end-devices.
It was evident from the results, depicted in Figure 10, that the use of miners in Incentive-BC1
solution resulted in the accumulation of more rewards for end-devices. This was evident from the
increased number of service requests being fulfilled given the aid of miners. For instance, with a
simulation run of 500 participants, the total amount of rewards accumulated using the Incentive-BC1
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Fig. 9. Comparing the delay encountered in forming blockchains as the number of participants varies for
four different solutions.
solution was 477 reward units (337 for end-device and 140 for miners). On the contrary, the total
amount of rewards accumulated using the Incentive-BC2 solution was 292 reward units. That is
an increase of 45 reward units just for the end-devices, in addition to the rewards distributed to
the miners. By comparing the proportion of rewards distributed among end-devices and miners
using the proposed Incentive-BC1 solution, we see that miners have nearly a third of the rewards in
comparison to end-devices.
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Fig. 10. Accumulated rewards for both end-devices and miners using the Incentive-BC1 and Incentive-BC2
solutions.
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The vision of beyond 5G communication technologies is to provide connectivity for intelligent
connected things. End-devices will have the capability of performing sophisticated intelligent tasks
with minimal or in most cases without reliance on centralized or semi-centralized entities like
fog, MEC, and cloud computing. Such tactile internet infrastructures will enable seamless and
smart interaction between humans and machines to achieve revolutionized solutions for different
ecosystems. This article introduced a cooperative IoT framework that relies on blockchain-enabled
resource sharing and service composition through volunteer computing. Device capabilities are
advertised and made available for sharing using blockchain. Incentives in the form of rewards
are are given to participants to ensure fair and balanced cooperative resource usage. Miners
are used to search for non-advertised service capabilities to ensure a fast and reliable service
provisioning framework. Experimental evaluations conducted in the form of simulations showed
that the proposed solution provides adequate and fair distributed rewards to all participants in the
blockchain formation process. Moreover, high values of service hit ratio and balanced resource
usage among participants was also experienced under the premise of high IoT device availability.
For future work, we plan to integrate the concept of federated learning with volunteer computing.
IoT devices will collaborate together in the learning process and share their learnt models using
blockchains without reliance on any centralized training. This will ensure both data privacy and
network security.
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